Embracing events in causal modelling: Interventions and counterfactuals in CP-logic by Vennekens, Joost et al.
Embracing events in causal modelling:
Interventions and counterfactuals in CP-logic
Joost Vennekens?1, Maurice Bruynooghe2, and Marc Denecker2
firstname . lastname @ cs.kuleuven.be
1 Campus De Nayer, Jan De Nayerlaan 5, 2860 Sint-Katelijne-Waver, Belgium
2 Dept. Comp. Sc., K.U. Leuven, Celestijnenlaan 200A, 3001 Heverlee, Belgium
Abstract. This paper integrates Pearl’s seminal work on probability
and causality with that of Shafer. Using the language of CP-logic, it
transposes Pearl’s analysis of interventions and counterfactuals to the se-
mantic context of Shafer’s probability trees. This gives us definitions that
work not on the level of random variables, but on the level of Humean
events. There are some tangible benefits to our approach: we can ele-
gantly handle counterfactuals in the context of cyclic causal relations,
and are able to consider interventions that are both more fine-grained
and more elaborate than Pearl’s.
1 Introduction
Causal statements implicitly refer to things that happen. For instance, the
statement “syphilis causes paresis” refers to the biological process of syphilis
spirochaetes damaging certain brain cells. It is by means of this process that
patients who at first exhibit only a syphilis infection will eventually come to ex-
hibit paresis as well. The causal statement itself leaves the details of this process
implicit and just asserts its existence: “somehow,” it says, “syphilis causes pare-
sis.” Each causal statement of this form (e.g., dropping a vase causes it to break,
a voltage drop causes an electrical current, being born in Belgium causes Bel-
gian citizenship) implicitly refers to some such implicit process, to some implicit
thing that happens to generate the effect from its cause.
In [9], Shafer recognizes the importance of this dynamic aspect of causality
and introduces a specific term for these implicit things-that-happen: Humean
events. The adjective “Humean” is added to avoid confusion with the technical
meaning that the term “event” has in probability theory. That is, a Humean
event is not a subset of some sigma algebra, nor a set of possible outcomes of
some experiment, but simply, as in everyday language, something that happens.
Following the line of thought from the preceding paragraph, Shafer places this
concept at the centre of his work, using probability trees to model causal systems
as sequences of Humean events. In this context, a random variable (RV), for
instance, is simply something which gets assigned a certain value at some point
in the sequence of events.
? Partially supported by IWT-Vlaanderen.
A different approach is taken by Pearl [7]. His probabilistic causal models
(PCMs) represent the relations between RVs as they hold in stable states of
the domain (i.e., when no more Humean events are happening). His models,
therefore, do not care about which event causes the value of an RV, or when
this happens. For instance, [5] uses the term “event” to refer to an assignment
X = x of values to RVs. Unlike proper Humean events, such assignments are
not things that intrinsically happen at a certain point in time, as part of a
larger sequence of events. Underlying one such an assignment, there may be
many different Humean events, happening at different times, and it may even
depend on the context (i.e., the outcome of previous events) which events are
involved in a particular assignment. For instance, a patient being in hospital
(Hospital = true) may be the result of a car crash yesterday (a Humean event),
but also, if he managed to avoid the crash, of slipping on the stairs this morning
(a different Humean event). Shafer’s account therefore presents a more refined
view on the dynamic aspects of causality than Pearl’s. However, it lacks Pearl’s
thorough treatment of interventions and counterfactuals.
In [10] (and before at JELIA 2006) , we presented a logical language called
CP-logic (the “CP” stands for causal and probabilistic), which offers a succinct
syntax for describing classes of Shaferian probability trees. We will now use this
language to provide the semantics of probability trees with a suitable notion
of interventions. In the same way as Shafer’s account of causality in terms of
Humean events can be seen as a refinement of the RV-based model employed by
Pearl, our account of interventions and counterfactuals in CP-logic will constitute
a useful refinement of the account found in [7].
2 Preliminaries: CP-logic
We assume familiarity with classical logic and briefly recall CP-logic. For simplic-
ity, we omit function symbols and make the Herbrand assumption of identifying
interpretations with sets of ground atoms. More detail can be found in [10].
A causal probabilistic law, or CP-law for short, is a statement r of the form:
∀x (A1 : α1) ∨ · · · ∨ (An : αn)← φ.
Here, φ is a first-order formula, the Ai are atoms, the αi are non-zero proba-
bilities, and the tuple of variables x contains all free variables in φ and the Ai.
Intuitively, for each x, φ(x) causes some implicit Humean event, which will result
in at most one of the effects Ai(x). For each i, αi is the probability of Ai being
the resulting effect. Therefore, we require
∑
αi ≤ 1. If the equality holds, exactly
one Ai is caused; otherwise, it is possible that the Humean event passes without
any (visible) effect on the state of the world. For mathematical uniformity, we
introduce the notation r= to refer to r itself if the equality holds, and otherwise
to the CP-law: ∀x (A1 : α1) ∨ · · · ∨ (An : αn) ∨ (— : 1−
∑
i αi)← φ. Here, the
dash represents the possibility of there being no (visible) effect. For a CP-law
r, we denote x by vars(r), refer to φ as body(r), to the sequence (Ai, αi)ni=1 as
head(r), and to (Ai)ni=1 as headAt(r). We also allow the condition body(r) to be
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omitted, which means that the Humean event always happens. We abbreviate
(A : 1)← φ by A← φ. A CP-theory is a finite set of CP-laws.
We now recall the semantics of such a CP-theory. For simplicity, we will
assume that each precondition body(r) is a positive formula. The semantics of
negation can be found in [10].
Our basic semantic construct is a probability tree [9], i.e., a finite tree in
which each edge is labeled with a probability, such that the labels of all edges
leaving the same internal node always sum up to one. Intuitively, such a tree
T represents a probabilistic process: each node is a state of the process and,
together, the edges leaving a node represent a Humean event that causes a
probabilistic transition to one of its children. The root is the initial state and
the leaves are final states. Let us denote by piT the probability distribution that a
tree T defines over its leaves, i.e., for each leaf l, piT (l) is the product of the labels
of the edges that lead to l. We now define which probability trees T correspond
to a given set of CP-laws C. Basically, the events that happen in T should follow
the blueprints given by the CP-laws in C. An occurrence of a CP-law r ∈ C is
the result r[x/c] of replacing the variables x = vars(r) by constants c. The
grounding grnd(C) of C consist of all occurrences of CP-laws r ∈ C that can be
thus constructed. Because we have no function symbols and only a finite set of
constants, this grounding is finite.
Condition 1 Events correspond to occurrences of CP-laws, i.e., there exists a
mapping E from the internal nodes s of T to grnd(C) such that we can label the
nodes and the edges of T as: if E(s) = r[x/c] and head((r[x/c])=) = (Ai, αi)ni=0,
then the children of s are nodes s0, . . . , sn such that the label lbl(si) = Ai and
lbl((s, si)) = αi. For uniformity, the root is labeled with ‘—’ (“no-effect”).
Condition 2 An occurrence that has already happened cannot happen again.
Formally, let Anc(s) be the ancestors of s (not including s itself), and let R(s)
be the set of occurrences that have not yet happened in s (i.e., R(s) = grnd(C)\
{E(s′) | s′ ∈ Anc(s)}). Then each E(s) must be in R(s).
Finally, we relate the nodes in the tree to the effects and preconditions of
the occurrences. Recall that each node s in a probability tree corresponds to a
potential state of the domain. We represent this state by an interpretation (i.e.,
a set of ground atoms) as follows: I(s) = ⋃t∈Anc(s)∪{s} l(t), where l(t) = {} if
lbl(t) = ‘− ’ and {lbl(t)} otherwise.
Condition 3 The precondition of the occurrence of a CP-law that happens in
a node must be satisfied in its state, i.e., for all internal nodes s: I(s) |=
body(E(s)).
The three conditions above describe when a probability tree unfolds according
to the CP-laws of a theory C. We call such a tree an execution model of C if it
is also complete in the following sense:
Condition 4 T cannot be extended, i.e., for each leaf l and r ∈ R(l), we have
that I(l) 6|= body(r).
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While we lack space for an example at this point, Fig. 1 on page 6 show an
execution model for Example 1. By defining a probability distribution piT over
its leaves, an execution model T induces a probabilistic possible world semantics:
the probability piT (S) of an interpretation S is
∑
I(l)=S piT (l). The probability
of a formula φ is then piT (φ) =
∑
S|=φ piT (S). In [10], it was shown that each
execution model T of a CP-theory C defines the same possible world semantics
piT , which we therefore also denote as piC . This result demonstrates one sense
in which causal statements are indeed justified in leaving implicit the Humean
events to which they refer: as long as we are only interested in the final states that
will eventually be reached (and not in any intermediate states), the properties
of these implicit events do not matter.
CP-logic normally distinguishes exogenous from endogenous predicates [10].
Here, however, we will save some space by writing “∀x (Exo(x) : ∗) ←” to say
that Exo should really be exogenous, but that we will treat it as an endogenous
predicate caused with some unknown probability ∗. For the examples in this
paper, it is easy to see that the proper treatment of exogenous predicates would
yield the same results.
CP-logic is closely related to Probabilistic Causal Models (PCMs). A PCM
that contains only boolean equations with boolean RVs can easily be translated
to a CP-theory that contains for each PCM equation a single CP-law that prop-
agates the value of the body of the equation to its head. Conversely, CP-theories
can also be translated to PCMs. If the CP-theory contains no cycles (to be dis-
cussed below), then this is trivial. Otherwise, artificial RVs representing common
causes underlying all of the variables in a cycle are needed. See [10] for details.
3 Interventions
The goal of this section is to provide CP-logic with definitions that capture
Pearl’s intuitions about interventions. Let us briefly recall some of the formal
tools used by Pearl. A structural model is a set of structural equations, each of
which defines the value of one RV in terms of the values of some other RVs. A
Probabilistic Causal Model (PCM) consists of a structural model, together with a
probability distribution over the values of its exogenous RVs (i.e., those without
a defining equation). An important restriction is that, given any assignment of
values to the exogenous RVs, this set of equations must have a unique solution.
Typically, this is ensured by requiring an acyclic set of equations.
An intervention in a PCM is of the form do(X = x) with X of a tuple
of endogenous variables and x a tuple of values. Performing this intervention
means replacing the defining equation of each Xi ∈ X by Xi := xi. In a logical
framework, we can view a PCM as an acyclic set of equations A := φ where A
is a ground atom and φ a sentence. An intervention do(A = a) then assigns a
tuple of truth values a ∈ {t, f}n to the tuple of atoms A, while removing their
defining equations. In this paper, we will not consider interventions at the level
of random variables (i.e., atoms) as Pearl does, but look instead at interventions
that add and/or prevent CP-laws to/in a theory. Because CP-logic represents a
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causal system in a modular way as a set of causal laws, this kind of intervention
is already built into its semantics.
Definition 1. Let C be a CP-theory. An intervention is a pair (R,A) with R a
subset of C (a preemption) and A a set of laws not in C (an addition). The result
of performing (R,A) on C, denoted C (R,A), is the CP-theory (C \R) ∪A.
Let r be ∀x (A1 : α1)∨· · ·∨ (An : αn)← φ. For atoms A ⊆ {Ai | 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
let r|−A be this CP-law without the atoms A, i.e.,
r|−Ai = ∀x
∨
Ai 6∈A(Ai : αi) ← φ.
Let r|+Ai be the CP-law Ai ← φ. An intervention that blocks only the possible ef-




forces the outcome of the event caused by φ to be Ai.
We can use this notion of intervention to simulate Pearl’s interventions. A
Pearl-style intervention Int = do(A0 = t, . . . , Am = t, B0 = f , . . . , Bn = f)
corresponds to a pair (R,A) where R =
⋃n
j≥0{r ∈ C | Bj ∈ headAt(r)} and
A =
⋃n
j≥0{r|−{Bj |0≤j≤n} | r ∈ R} ∪
⋃m
i≥0{“Ai ← ”}. Given a PCM P and
its corresponding CP-theory C (as in [10]), performing intervention Int on P
produces the same probability distribution as performing the intervention (R,A)
on P . (Proof omitted because of space restrictions.)
4 Counterfactuals
Let us again start by recalling Pearl’s treatment of counterfactuals. He considers
the following class of statements:
Given X︸ ︷︷ ︸
explanation
,would Y have happened,︸ ︷︷ ︸
prediction
had we done Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
intervention
?
Pearl’s intuition is to read such a statement as: if we do the intervention Z,
will Y then hold, assuming that, insofar as the intervention does not interfere,
whatever lead to X in the first place will still happen in the same way as it
did before? He therefore suggests the following three-step process for evaluating
such statements in a PCM.
Explanation: update the a priori distribution over the exogenous variables by
the observation X.
Intervention: apply the intervention Z to the model.
Prediction: compute the probability of Y in the resulting model, using the a
posteriori distribution given X, i.e., we look at P (Y | do(Z), X).
Again, our goal is to see how we can apply these intuitions in the context of
CP-logic. Let us introduce our approach with an example from [7].
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Example 1. A court might order the death of a prisoner. The probability of this
is p. The execution is to be performed by a two person firing squad. If the court
so decides, the captain of the firing squad orders both of his riflemen to fire.
However, rifleman A is of the nervous type, and might shoot even if not ordered
to. This happens with probability q. If at least one rifleman fires, the prisoner
dies. In CP-logic, this becomes:
(Court : p)← (1)
Capt← Court (2)
Fires(A)← Capt (3)




Note that (4) contains negation, the semantics of which was not explained in
Section 2 but can be found in [10]. We could also omit ¬Capt from this CP-law;
the only effect would be that Fires(A) might redundantly be caused twice (in
branch l2 of Fig. 1a), which does not change the semantics of this theory.















































































Fig. 1. Execution models of example 1.
question: “If the prisoner is dead, what
is the probability that he would still
be dead if rifleman A had not shot?”
Intuition puts it at the probability
that the prisoner’s death is due to
the court ordering his execution, i.e.,
at P (Court|Death) = pq(1−p)+p , be-
cause it is precisely in this case that
the intervention of preventing A from
firing will not save the prisoner (since
B will also fire). We can reach this
conclusion with a CP-logic variant of
Pearl’s three steps, starting from the
execution model T in Fig. 1a.
Explanation: T defines a probabil-
ity distribution piT over its leaves. Hav-
ing observed Death, we can update
this distribution: because l1 and l2 are
the branches where the prisoner dies,
the a posteriori probability P (l1 | Death) is q(1−p)/n and P (l2 | Death) = p/n
with n = q(1− p) + p.
Intervention: To prevent A from firing, we apply the intervention that removes
CP-laws (3) and (4). Now, as shown in Fig. 1b, if all the remaining events hap-
pen in the same way as they happened in l1, the prisoner survives; on the other
hand, as Fig. 1c shows, if they happen as they happened in l2, he still dies.
Prediction: Having thus determined that the intervention would have pre-
vented the prisoner’s death just in case the original execution model was ac-
tually in branch l2 instead of l1, we can now judge the desired probability to be
piT (l2 | Death), which is p/n.
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To make this more formal, we need a number of definitions. Let us choose
an execution model T for our theory (it can be shown that the choice does not
affect the outcome). In the explanation step, we condition on the observation X
as follows.
Definition 2. For a formula X, we define the conditional probability piT (l | X)
of a leaf l of T given X to be 0 if I(l) 6|= X and piT (l)/piT (X) otherwise.
In the intervention step, we consider what would have happened in different
circumstances, under the assumption that all events that are not affected would
still have happened in the same way as they originally happened.
Definition 3. Let l be a leaf of an execution model of a CP-theory C and B(l)
the branch that leads to l. By Cl we denote the CP-theory that fixes the outcome
of all the events that happened in B(l) to the outcome they had in B(l):
Cl = {r ∈ C | r ∈ R(l)} ∪ {r|+H | ∃s ∈ B : lbl(s) = H and E(parent(s)) = r}.
For instance, if we fix the outcomes that occurred in l1:
Cl1 =







We now define counterfactual probabilities as follows.
Definition 4. Let X,Y be formulas (respectively observation and prediction)
and Z an intervention. The counterfactual probability of Y after Z given X is
Cfl(X,Y, Z) =
∑
l is leaf of T pi(C Z)l(Y ) · piT (l | X).
In our example, performing the intervention Z = ({(3), (4)}, {}) on the theory
produces the following C Z:{
(Court : p)←,




In (C Z)l1 , the first of these CP-laws reduces to “– ←”, whereas in (C Z)l2 , it
reduces to “Court ←”. The reader can verify that the branch in Fig. 1b indeed
corresponds to (C Z)l1 and that Fig. 1c corresponds to (C Z)l2 . So,
Cfl(Death,Death, Z) = 0 · q(1−p)q(1−p)+p + 0 + 1 · pq(1−p)+p .
5 Causal cycles
Let us now amend the previous example, by adding that each of the two soldiers
will also fire when he hears the guy next to him fire. In CP-logic, this is a pretty
innocuous change; we simply add:
Fires(A)← Fires(B). F ires(B)← Fires(A).
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The only effect of this change is that now two soldiers will fire in circumstances
where previously only one would, which raises the probability of Fires(B) from
p to p+ (1− p)q. Because one soldier firing already suffices to kill the prisoner,
however, this does not affect the probability of his death.
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that such cyclic causality cannot
be adequately handled in Pearl’s framework. To this end, we will examine a
number of ways of trying to do this, and discuss what is wrong with each of
them.
First, let us note that it obviously does not suffice to leave the equation for
Fires(A) untouched and change only the equation for Fires(B) into:
Fires(B) := Captain ∨ Fires(A).
Indeed, when we intervene with Fires(B), for instance by sabotaging his rifle so
that it will go off even without the soldier pulling the trigger, the effect should be
that A also fires, which the current equation for Fires(A) will not accomplish.
One is therefore tempted to also make this change:
Fires(A) := Caption ∨Nervous ∨ Fires(B).
Together with our modification of the equation for Fires(B), however, this
clearly violates the acyclicity restriction. In the appendix to [4], Halpern and
Pearl present a way of lifting this restriction. However, their semantics is not
what is needed for this example: they impose an equilibrium condition, where
every assignment that satisfies all equations is considered possible. Therefore, it
is possible for A to fire for no reason than that B does, and at the same time
for B to fire for no other reason than that A does. Clearly, this is not what we
want for this example: if the soldiers fire, then at least one of them should have
a reason for firing that is not his comrade firing first.
This problem with the semantics of course has consequence for the results
that are produced. For instance, even the tautological counterfactual “given that
the prisoner survived, he would have survived” cannot be deemed true. Moreover,
it also becomes impossible to judge the probability of the prisoner dying any more
accurate than that it must be somewhere in the interval [p+ (1− p)q, 1].
The transformation from CP-logic to Bayesian networks given in [10] would
attempt to solve this problem by introducing an intermediate RV BothFire,
replacing the equations for Fires(A) and Fires(B) by:
BothFire := Nervous ∨ Captain F ires(A) := BothFire
F ires(B) := BothFire
This works insofar as that it generates the right probability distribution for
Death, but it breaks down when intervention come into play. The reason is
of course that this model has removed the asymmetry between Fires(A) and
Fires(B): it no longer has the information that A, and not B, is the soldier who
might fire out of nervousness. Consequently, if we ask: “given that the captain
did not give the order to fire, would B have fired if we had prevented A from
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firing?”, then the above model has no way of knowing that the answer should
be “no”.
We are therefore forced into more complicated options, such as including
multiple copies of our original RVs. For instance, we can have Firesi(A) and
Firesi(B) for i ∈ {1, 2}:
Fires2(A) := Fires1(A) ∨ Fires1(B)
Fires2(B) := Fires1(B) ∨ Fires1(A)
Fires1(A) := Captain ∨Nervous
F ires1(B) := Captain
We can think here of the indices as a timestamp for the RVs, which explicitly
encodes the small time delay between hearing your neighbour firing and firing
yourself. In general, for a firing squad of n soldiers, in which a soldier firing causes
his two neighbours to fire too, we would need n copies of each RV, allowing a
“falling domino”-style propagation through the squad. An intervention such as
preventing soldier S from firing should then be interpreted as an intervention
with all RVs Si, i = 1..n.
This solution is correct, but has the downside of blowing up the representa-
tion: simply adding the domino-effect forces us to abandon the original represen-
tation in terms of n RVs, in favour of a new representation in term of n2 RVs.
This is neither concise, nor elaboration tolerant. By contrast, in CP-logic, one
just needs to add the obvious n CP-laws, in terms of the original vocabulary:
Fires(S1)← Fires(S2).
. . .
F ires(Si)← Fires(Si−1) ∨ Fires(Si+1).
. . .
F ires(Sn)← Fires(Sn−1).
In this case, one can still defend the PCM solution as an accurate picture of
reality: even though the problem description does not mention it, the propagation
of shots down the firing line would in fact not be instantaneous, since each
soldier takes some time to fire. However, this is not always possible. Consider,
for instance, a bicycle which has a big and a small gear wheel connected by a
chain. If we turn one of these wheels, the other will turn too. Moreover, this
effect will be instantaneous; there is no perceptible delay between turning one
and seeing the other turn. Again, CP-logic handles this fine:
Turn(Big)← Turn(Small).
Turn(Small)← Turn(Big). Turn(Big)← Peddle.
The reader can easily check that this behaves correctly in the face of all con-
ceivable interventions (e.g., manually turning a gear wheel, removing the chain,
blocking a gear wheel).
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To represent this system as a PCM, we would need to perform the same trick
as before:
Turn2(Big) := Turn1(Big) ∨ Turn1(Small). (8)
Turn2(Small) := Turn1(Big) ∨ Turn1(Small). (9)
Turn1(Big) := Peddle (10)
However, the newly introduced RVs are now truly artificial: one can no longer
explain the difference between Turn1(Big) and Turn2(Big) in real-world terms,
because, unlike in the firing squad, it cannot be the case that these RVs refer
to the condition of the same gear wheel at different points in time. In this case,
Turn2 will tell us which wheels will turn, while Turn1 has no real-world meaning.
The need to invent artificial RVs in order to model the perfectly intuitive causal
relation between these two gear wheels makes this an inadequate representation.
6 More interventions
As Pearl’s book explains, one of the reasons for wanting formal definitions of
interventions and their effects is that human experts tend to misjudge such
things. Thanks to Pearl, however, such judgments are no longer needed: all you
need to do is (1) come up with a causal model of the domain, and (2) figure
out how to formulate the intervention you want to consider in terms of the
vocabulary of this causal model. All else, i.e., actually figuring out the effect of
the intervention, can then be left up to the formal definitions.
One obvious limitation of this methodology is that it is of course not nec-
essarily possible to formulate the intervention you want to consider in terms of
the vocabulary of the causal model. In such a case, you cannot blindly let the
definitions do the work, but you must still get actively involved and make some
changes to the original model. While this cannot be avoided, we may hope to
make this need for manual intervention as small as possible. That is, we would
like our causal models and formal tools to allow as many reasonable interven-
tions as possible to be applied “unthinkingly”, without the need to tinker with
the original causal model.
Some examples of reasonable interventions and associated counterfactuals:
– If we were to remove the chain from our bicycle, peddling would still cause
the big gear wheel to turn, but the small wheel would no longer turn with
it. Therefore, given that you originally were peddling, the big wheel would
still have been turning, even if you had removed the chain.
– Suppose we could send soldier A to some additional training, which decreases
his nervousness from q to q/2. If we had done this, the probability of the
prisoner dying would have dropped from p+ (1− p)q to p+ (1− p) q2 .
– In the example of the n person firing squad, suppose that A fired out of
nervousness, which caused all other rifleman to fire as well. Would this still
have happened if we had somehow managed to make our soldiers a little
more stress resistant, such that they would only have fired themselves if both
their neighbours fired, instead of at least one?
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In CP-logic, each of these three examples corresponds to a straightforward in-
tervention with the original theory, namely:(
{Turn(Big)← Turn(Small), Turn(Small)← Turn(Big)}, {}
)
(





{Fires(Si)← Fires(Si−1) ∨ Fires(Ss+1) | 1 < i < n},
{Fires(Si)← Fires(Si−1) ∧ Fires(Ss+1) | 1 < i < n}
)
Pearl, however, considers only interventions that replace the defining equations
for some RVs X by truth assignments X = x. If we start from the PCMs for
these example as we gave them in the previous section, then none of the three
interventions listed above actually corresponds to such an intervention X = x:
– To remove the effect of the small gear wheel on the big one, Pearl would have
to preempt the equation that defines whether the big wheel turns (equation
(8)). However, this also removes the effect of peddling.
– Because Pearl’s interventions fix RVs to a specific value, they cannot contain
a probability distribution.
– For the same reason, they can also not introduce a new relation between
existing RVs.
In all of these cases, the fix is to somehow already include the intervention that
we wish to perform in the model. For instance, for the second case:
Fires(A) := Captain ∨NervousWithoutTraining ∧ ¬Training
∨NervousWithTraining ∧ Training.
In itself, this is not hard, but for the reasons outlined at the beginning of this
section, the CP-logic way of handling such interventions without changing the
original causal model is preferable.
7 Related work
Shortcomings of PCMs have already been recognized in the literature. For in-
stance, Hopkins and Pearl [6] join us in observing that: “In structural causal
models, everything is represented as a random variable. Thus, one cannot distin-
guish between an enduring condition (e.g. the man is dead) versus a transitional
event (e.g. the man dies).” They then attempt to fix this and other problems,
by means of Situation Calculus. To us, this seems like overkill. SitCalc is an
expressive action language, which contains many features that go beyond what
is traditionally expressed in a causal model (e.g., preconditions for actions, flu-
ents that might spontaneously change value, and frame axioms for prohibiting
fluents from spontaneously changing values). For typical causal reasoning prob-
lems, these features are not needed: for instance, one is always free to consider
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any intervention (= action) whatsoever, and the value of the fluents is fully
bound by the causal laws. In any case, Hopkins’ approach requires that all “in-
tervenable” properties be represented as SitCalc actions, which means that (1)
it cannot handle causal cycles such as the gear wheels any better than regular
PCMs (Section 5), and (2) it is equally limited in the kind of interventions that
can be considered without changing the original model (Section 6).
The semantics of CP-logic is closely related to the well-founded model con-
struction of logic programming (LP). There are a number of other LP languages
that deal with probability and causality, on which we will now briefly comment.
We discuss only issues related to the specific topic of this paper (interventions
and counterfactuals); for a more general comparison, we refer to [10].
P-log [1] is a language that performs probabilistic reasoning with answer
sets. It comes equipped with a do-operator for performing interventions, which,
as shown in [2], can be used to perform counterfactual reasoning in P-log. Es-
sentially, this do-operator is the same as Pearl’s. Therefore, we could repeat here
the comments made earlier. P-log translates its causal models, together with
interventions and observations, to an ASP program, which is then combined
with an ASP knowledge base. Instead of relying on the do-operator, one can also
update such a program by adding additional ASP rules. These “non-monotonic
updates”, as they are called, provide a much more flexible system for interven-
tions, but they do require knowledge of how the high-level probabilistic construct
are translated into the ASP encoding. A second similarity between P-log and
Pearl is P-log’s coherence criterion, which is similar to Pearl’s condition that an
assignment of values to the exogenous variables should uniquely determine the
values of the endogenous ones. Moreover, like Pearl, Baral et al. suggest ensuring
this criterion by means of an acyclicity condition. The arguments we gave earlier
regarding the advantages of CP-logic when it comes to representing cyclic causal
relations also carry over to P-log.
As shown in [10], Poole’s Independent Choice Logic (ICL) [8] is a sublan-
guage of CP-logic, to which the whole logic can be mapped in a polynomial and
modular way. [3] examines interventions (as well as related notions such as actual
causes and explanations) in this logic. However, they arrive at their definitions
by means of a transformation into Pearl’s causal models. This is the opposite of
our approach: they take the fine-grained, event-based representation (restricted
to the acyclic case), compile it into the coarser RV-based representation, and
then do the interventions there. As we have argued above, there are significant
advantages to defining interventions directly on CP-laws.
8 Conclusions
This paper has presented an analysis of interventions and counterfactuals, that
reformulates Pearl’s intuitions in the Shaferian framework of CP-logic. Our treat-
ment has some attractive features: we can elegantly handle cyclic causality and
can deal with several kinds of interventions that, for various reasons, can only
by handled by Pearl at the cost of tinkering with the original model.
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Besides these practical advantages, our work also makes philosophical contri-
butions. First, it ties together different approaches to causality from the litera-
ture: we investigate Pearl’s interventions and counterfactuals in Shafer’s seman-
tic context, using the LP-based language of CP-logic to syntactically describe
classes of probability trees.
Second, we also add a touch of clarity to the picture painted by Pearl. His
book considers causal models in two different languages: Bayesian networks and
PCMs. While they are formally very similar—every Bayesian network is easily
transformed into a PCM—they embody views on the nature of causality that
are ontologically quite different: Bayesian networks represent causal relations as
inherently probabilistic, while PCMs express the Laplacian view that causal re-
lations are completely deterministic and uncertainty stems solely from a lack of
knowledge about their “inputs”. Pearl’s book adopts Bayesian networks through-
out the chapters that first introduce the idea of interventions. When eventually
the topic of counterfactuals arises, however, a switch is made to the Laplacian
view of PCMs. It is peculiar that, on the one hand, interventions should be eas-
iest to explain under the assumption that causal relations are inherently proba-
bilistic, while on the other hand, their use for counterfactual reasoning requires
the assumption that causal relations are deterministic. Our paper shows that
CP-logic’s event-based view on causality reconciles these two views: whether a
Humean event happens is deterministic (in any given state of the world), but its
outcome can be probabilistic. In this way, CP-logic can match Bayesian networks
as a natural representation for probabilistic causal relations, while also, as this
paper has shown, surpassing PCMs as a counterfactual reasoning tool.
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